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1 INTRODUCTION
In 1992, in common with much of the rest of Southern
Africa, Zambia was hit by a severe rainfall failure.
Although total rainfall for the 1992/93 agricultural
season was not much below the levels of recent years,
a cessation of precipitation for almost two months,
coupled with a period of abnormally high tempera-
tures in most of the southern and eastern areas of
the country, resulted in a failure of the maize crop,
the main food staple for almost all the population
(World Bank 1993). The impact of this climatic shock
was exacerbated by a high level of structural poverty,
resulting from more than 15 years of poor economic
performance and declining incomes, and by previ-
ous policy regimes which had given priority to the
production of maize at the expense of more drought-
tolerant crops. The shock also occurred at a time of
substantial political change. The emergency was an-
nounced within four months of the installation of a
new government which had taken office following
the first multi-party democratic elections for more
than 20 years.
In the classification adopted for this Bulletin, the
1992 shock in Zambia can be identified as a slow
onset emergency, triggered by a rainfall failure. It
was a slow onset emergency in the sense that, al-
though the shock occurred in January and February
1992, its impact was not felt until the harvest the
following year in May and June 1993. The nature of
the emergency was complicated, however, by the
widespread level of poverty in both urban and
rural areas and by the process of political and
economic change. This in turn had important impli-
cations for both the immediate response to the shock
and the organization of the relief effort.
An analysis of the links between relief and develop-
ment in Zambia is important for three main reasons.
First, it demonstrates the role of development
policy, especially in relation to agriculture and food
security, in determining the extent to which people
are vulnerable to climatic shocks. Second, it illus-
trates the immense potential of community organiza-
fions and non-governmental agencies when pro-
vided with adequate resources and an appropriate
framework for action. The need to organize and
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deliver a massive relief programme at a time
when government institutions were in a state of
flux resulting from the move from a one-party state
to the democratic system of the Third Republic meant
that the burden of response inevitably fell on the
non-governmental sector. And, third, the apparent
success of the relief programme in averting famine,
together with the establishment of a successful part-
nership with community based organizations, has
resulted in a consensus about the need to move
from relief to development. There is now wide-
spread support in Zambia for the development of
an effective social safety net involving govern-
ment, donors and the non-governmental sector.
2 DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1992
2.1 Economic progress
The Zambian economy grew rapidly in the immedi-
ate post-Independence period. During the copper
price boom between 1964 and 1973, revenues from
copper were used to finance extensive investments
in both economic and social infrastructure. By the
early 1970s, Zambia was considered to be one of
richest countries in Eastern and Southern Africa
(Seshamani 1990). The economy was vulnerable to
fluctuations in the world economy, however, and
was hit by the oil price shocks of the middle and late
1970s and by a collapse in the copper price. Between
1973 and 1984, the commodity terms of trade de-
clined by more than 77 per cent; between 1975 and
1980 import volumes declined by 30 per cent.
The initial response was to treat the shocks as tempo-
rary and to maintain consumption levels by increasing
borrowing, resulting in a rapid build up of external
debt. The structure of the economy, which was
highly centralized and import dependent, meant
that adjustment to the shocks was both difficult and
slow. The reduction in imports resulted in a substan-
tial decline in productive capacity, which in turn
was fed through to incomes and food security.
From about 1980 onwards it was clear that a more
structured response was needed, and the govern-
ment introduced a series of economic reform and
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adjustment measures throughout the 1980s and early
1990s. These seem to have been driven by two
conflicting pressures: externally, from the ¡MF and
World Bank, to adjust to imbalances and liberalize
the economy; and, internally, to protect the con-
sumption levels of key groups, especially urban,
formal sector workers (Pearce 1989). As a result there
was considerable policy instability, and major changes
in direction occurred a number of times in this pe-
riod.
As a result of lower prices for copper and the policy
instability, output remained largely static and infla-
tion increased rapidly. Investment was not sufficient
even to maintain the capital stock, let alone result in
new productive investment. Formal sector employ-
ment remained static between 1980 and 1990, and
declined as a percentage of a rapidly expanding
labour force (PIC 1991). The maintenance of employ-
ment levels was financed mainly through substantial
falls in the real value of wages.
2.2 The impact on people
As a result of the poor economic performance and
rapid population growth, real per capita GDP fell to
less than a third of its previous level between 1974
and 1984 (Seshamani op cit.). Zambia is now offi-
cially classified as a least developed country. It dis-
plays many of the characteristics of other countries at
similar levels of development (World Bank 1993), the
main difference being that many people can remem-
ber significantly better times.
The poor economic performance has been reflected
in measures of poverty and welfare. For example,
under-five mortality was about 190 per 1,000 live
births in 1992 (Gaisie et al. 1993). While this level is
comparable to other countries, with similar levels
of GDP, it does represent an apparent increase in
young child mortality of about 20 per cent since
1980. Zambia appears to be one of the very few
developing countries (other than those affected by
war) where the improvements in child survival seen
elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s have not only
slowed down, but seem to have been reversed. High
mortality levels are also associated with the in-
creasing impact of AIDS/HIV.
Food insecurity and malnutrition have increased: for
example, a 1991 study showed that an average house-
hold spent more than 70 per cent of its budget on
food (PIC 1992). Comparison with earlier studies
indicates that this proportion has been increasing,
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indicating greater pressure on households. In 1991
more than 60 per cent of households were apparently
unable to afford a nutritionally adequate diet, and
these data were collected at a time when levels of
subsidy on the consumer price of maize meal were
high. Subsequently subsidies were removed and
over a 12 month period, the nominal price of maize
meal increased by more than 10 times.
The economic decline has also affected the ability of
the government to continue to finance basic social
services. Between 1987 and 1991, real government
expenditure declined, but expenditure on some so-
cial services was reduced at a proportionally faster
rate (Kelly 1991). In particular, the proportion of
the budget devoted to general administration and
subsidies increased, while that allocated to education
fell and the health budget stayed the same.
Much of the immediate impact of the decline in
incomes has been experienced in the urban areas,
although urban incomes are still higher than in the
rural areas (CSO 1993a). As a result, income inequali-
ties in Zambia have apparently declined. As urban
incomes have been squeezed, the disparities between
urban and rural areas have reduced (World Bank
1993). Even so, the most deprived people are still in
rural areas, especially the more remote locations
away from the line of rail. In these locations, more
than 50 per cent of pre-school children appear to be
nutritionally stunted and infant mortality is among
the highest in Africa (Gaisie et al., op cit.).
2.3 The safety-net in the Second Republic
During the period of the Second Republic, from 1970
to 1991, the explicit aim of food policy in Zambia was
to protect the food consumption of key population
groups, especially formal sector employees in the
urban areas. Food policy concentrated on maize and
had two potentially conflicting objectives: to meet
market demand for maize from domestic produc-
tion; and to maintain a flow of cheap food to the
towns to help reduce pressure on wages (Pearce, op
cit.). The policy instruments used to achieve these
objectives included: control of the maize marketing
system; administrative setting of prices on a pan-
territorial and pan-seasonal basis; nationalization of
the large-scale millers; and the use of a range of
subsidies on production inputs and for transport
and marketing costs.
One outcome of these policies was to make the
urban consumer price of maize meal politically
sensitive. Major policy changes have been forced
on the government in the past as a result of political
pressure resulting from price increases. The policy
dilemma at the macro level has been mirrored by
the problem of managing food policy at the sectoral
and micro levels. Here the trade-offs have been
between the need to maintain low food prices and
tight controls on maize marketing, against the cost of
subsidies and pressures from donors for market
liberalization. The main effect of the subsidies seems
to have been to encourage maize production in areas
where it probably did not have comparative advan-
tage and to transfer income from rural producers
to urban consumers (World Bank 1992).
At different times, attempts were made to reduce the
cost of subsidies, of which the most important was
the introduction in 1989 of the food coupon system,
a loosely targeted food stamp programme in urban
areas. While this did achieve the fiscal objective,
there is little evidence to suggest that the coupons
were an effective means of protecting food security
(Pearce, op cit). Rural households were excluded
from the coupon system, even though most evidence
suggested that they were poorer and less food secure
than their urban counterparts.
In the period of political pressure leading up to the
elections in 1991 the consumer price of maize meal
became an important political indicator. In an effort
to retain popularity, the government re-introduced
general price subsidies and the price was kept con-
stant for a period of almost 15 months, at a time when
retail price inflation was in excess of 100 per cent
per year. At the time of the election, the fiscal cost of
price subsidies had again become prohibitive and
there was considerable pressure from donors for a
change in policy.
2.4 The Third Republic
The first multi-party elections for over 20 years in
1991 resulted in a change of government, and the
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) took
office with a clear mandate for policy change. This
included a rapid move to market liberalization, the
reduction of subsidies and greater efficiency in the
delivery of social services. An early priority was to
eliminate food subsidies and this was done over a 12
month period. The effect was to increase the
nominal consumer price of maize meal by more
than ten times from the pre-election level. At the
Defined as the disabled, sick, elderly and households with no able- 2 90 kg bags.
bodied adults
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same time, the food coupon system was abolished
and not replaced with any alternative food security
measure. The priorities of the new government were
to address the problems of the external and internal
imbalances, to promote growth and to reduce the
scope of government involvement in the economy.
Although the problems of poverty and food insecu-
rity were acknowledged by the new government, no
formal poverty strategy was developed. A Public
Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) was set up to
provide grants and other assistance to the long-
term destitute', but had a limited impact. In the first
year of operation, less than half of the funds
allocated were distributed. At the same time, the
government abolished the Prices and Incomes
Commission (PIc), the only institution with a man-
date and the capacity to undertake analysis of
poverty and food security issues.
3 THE 1992 DROUGHT AND THE RESPONSE
3.1 The magnitude of the emergency
The 1992 drought occurred within four months of
the election of the new government. Maize produc-
tion for the 1991/92 season was estimated at about
5.4 million bags2, compared with market demand in
a normal year of about 16 million bags (PAM 1993).
This production failure occurred at a time when
national stocks were already at a low level, because
of poor harvests in the previous two years.
The impact of the drought was undoubtedly made
worse because of past agricultural policies (World
Bank 1993). The emphasis on maize production for
sale and the existence of a pan-territorial and pan
seasonal pricing system had encouraged the plant-
ing of hybrid maize even in areas where it was not
really suited. Local storage and processing was
discouraged, which meant that few families had
sufficient stocks, even in areas which were known
to be drought prone.
At the beginning of the drought emergency, it was
estimated that about 835,000 tons of food imports
were needed in order to stabilize prices and meet
food requirements. Of this, about 117,00 tons were
needed for humanitarian assistance for up to 1.7
million people whose livelihoods had been directly
affected (PAM op cit.). This would be distributed
in three ways: as a wage on food-for-work, by means
of subsidized sale by NGOs, and free to those worst
affected. The remainder (almost three quarters of a
million tons) was required to stabilize maize prices
and to maintain food supplies in urban areas at
adequate levels. Both government and donors saw
this second objective as crucial and, initially, it was
identified as the top priority. The stability of the new
government, of the democratic reforms and of the
economic adjustment programme all required that
maize should continue to be widely available in
urban areas. Both politicians and officials still had
fresh memories of civil disturbances in urban areas,
prompted by rapid increase in food prices in 1987
and again in 1990.
The response to the emergency, both by the govern-
ment and donors, was remarkably rapid. Zambia
was the first country in the Southern African region
to issue an appeal to donors for assistance. The
donor community, led by the United States, responded
very quickly, at least by the standards of previous
emergencies. As a result, Zambia had obtained most
of the pledges it needed before the SADC appeal
was officially launched in June1992. The food import
gap was officially closed as early as September 1992
and, from May of that year onwards, food demand
in urban areas was largely met from food aid
shipments.
Bulk imports of grain were managed by an extra-
governmental agency, which was supported by
technical assistance from the United States. This
body was established by the Minister of Agriculture,
reported directly to him, and bypassed normal
government channels. In part, this arrangement
reflected the fact that official institutions were
weak and were to some extent distrusted by the
new government. In addition, the government was
able to finance some food imports itself and agree-
ment was received from the key donors to relax
some of the fiscal and monetary targets for the
economic adjustment programme.
Despite the perceived need to maintain food sup-
plies to urban areas, the government remained com-
mitted to the subsidy reduction programme. lt was
decided, however, in agreement with donors, that
imported maize (almost all of which was yellow
maize and thought not to be preferred by consumers)
Elections for local councils were not held until towards the end
of 1992. The previous system of appointed party (UNIt') officials
was largely discredited.
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would attract some subsidy on transport costs. This
was done so as to ensure that yellow maize was
sold at a discount compared with white maize. It
also reflected the very high transport costs on
imports from outside the Southern African region.
The monetization of large quantities of imported
maize generated substantial levels of counterpart
funds. Some of these were used to meet the
internal transport, handling and storage costs (ITSH)
for the humanitarian relief programme. The man-
agement of the counterpart funds remains an impor-
tant issue for both macro and sectoral policy in
Zambia.
Setting up the humanitarian relief programme took
a little longer. However, with support from WFP,
the Government established the Programme for the
Prevention of Malnutrition (PPM) to distribute relief
by May 1992 and the first shipments of food took
place in June and July. PPM was established from
the start as a partnership between government,
donors and NGOs. A policy decision was made by
Cabinet to deliver all relief through non-governmen-
tal organizations. This was in part a recognition that
local structures were very weak and that, local
government was largely non-existent3. It also
reflected the desire of both donors and govern-
ment to eliminate political interference with the
targeting and delivery of relief. Lead NGOs were
identified in each area affected by the drought
and they were given the responsibility for identify-
ing beneficiaries and for delivering assistance
(PAM, op cit.).
Previously in Zambia, drought relief had been
delivered as food handed out to recipients identi-
fied through the local party (UNIP) structure. In
1992, a key policy decision was to restrict the dis-
tribution of free food. While drought relief was
still to be made available in the form of maize,
the desired forms of distribution were either local
sale by NGOs, with subsidized transport costs, or
wages for people employed on public works
programmes. In fact, free distribution was limited
to 10 per cent of the total relief and NGOs
were instructed to undertake detailed local assess-
ments in order to identify people who qualified for
this assistance.
As with bulk imports, the management of PPM was
delegated to a new institution, the Programme
Against Malnutrition (PAM) which was established
as an NGO, outside normal government structures.
PPM and PAM reported directly to Ministers and
had access to decision making at the highest levels.
The major constraints encountered during the relief
operation were concerned with logistics, transport,
accurately accounting for and reporting resources
used, and some political interferenc e (PAM, op cit.).
In the last case, the problems were usually dealt
with by referring them to the national level. The
partnership of government, donors and NGOs in
general proved very effective in resisting political
interference in the management of the programme.
3.2 The impact of the relief programme
Although no formal assessment of the relief pro-
gramme has been undertaken, most observers agree
that the response to the drought was remarkably
effective. In urban areas, food prices were generally
stabilized, and maize was generally freely available
throughout the emergency period.4 In the rural
areas, famine was averted and there were no re-
ported deaths directly attributable to starvation or
famine related diseases. Although there was some
local movement of people, mainly in search of
water, there were no large-scale population move-
ments. About 50,000 jobs were created under PPM
and almost 250,000 tons of maize was distributed
to an estimated 2.5 million beneficiaries, over twice
the amount of 117,000t originally foreseen. Given
that Zambia had had very little previous experience
of large-scale food-for-work projects, this was a
remarkable achievement.
Key lessons learned from the management of the
relief programme included the need to ensure flex-
ibility of response. While overall policy and guide-
lines could be set at the centre, there was a need for
flexibility in their operation at the local level so that
the variety of conditions encountered in rural Zam-
bia could be catered for. The need for the effective
transmission of information from remote areas to the
centre and vice-versa was highlighted. The impor-
tance of community participation in the identifica-
tion of appropriate relief projects and in their man-
agement was also made clear. The success of many of
the projects was undoubtedly due to the fact that
local people had a direct stake in their success.
In fact maize prices rose steadily throughout the drought
emergency, but this was largely in response to the removal of
subsidies and to rapid general inflation.
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A food security monitoring system was established
with assistance from donors. Results from this sup-
port the impression of an effective relief programme
(CSO 1993b). Food prices in most communities were
stabilized and food was available in most areas,
although many people were dependent on food aid
for a year or more. The monitoring system did
identify other problems, however, which will require
attention in future emergency programmes. In par-
ticular, a worrying increase in the level of child
malnutrition was recorded in most areas and this
continued in the post-drought recovery period. It
is not clear whether this increase reflects a real
trend in rural areas as a whole or is related to
an increase in clinic attendance. It is likely, how-
ever, that the drought did place pressure on house-
hold livelihoods, even when relief food was fairly
readily available. Other factors, including greater
time pressure on women, who were the main partici-
pants in food-for-work projects, will also have
been important.
The monitoring system also identified health prob-
lems in the drought affected areas. There were
increases in morbidity of diseases such as measles,
and, in the post-drought period, epidemics of
cholera and meningitis were recorded. The manage-
ment of the relief programme placed considerable
strain on the primary health care system, which
meant that regular programmes, including mother
and child health, immunization and health educa-
tion, were constrained. Requests for assistance for
the non-food needs for drought management were
not identified as early, as the appeal for food aid
and donors were not able to respond in quite
the same manner. By the time needs were identified
and transmitted to donors, many budgets were
already fully committed.
3.3 From relief to development
The success of the relief programme, and especially
the partnership between NGOs, donors and govern-
ment through PPM, has resulted in a reappraisal
within government and the donor community of
the possibilities for a more proactive poverty and
food security policy. Two major positive benefits
have arisen from the drought experience in Zambia.
First, there is now a greater realization within gov-
ernment that many people in all areas of the country
are food insecure and at risk from external shocks.
Economic growth and efficient markets will not, on
their own, solve these problems and direct action
is required to sustain an adequate safety net.
Second, the success of PPM demonstrates that it
is possible to do something effective, that resources
can be mobilized and that a combination of commu-
nity action and appropriate policy can be successful
(PAM 1994). In the context of the experience towards
the end of the Second Republic, these are very
important changes.
The need for direct action to address poverty is
certainly clear. Even if the economic reform and
adjustment programme achieves its stated objec-
tives, it is unlikely that effective markets and re-
newed growth will solve the poverty problem in the
short term. With population growth in excess of
three per cent per year, it will take 40 years of
sustained growth at five per cent per annum simply
to get back to the average income levels of 15 years
ago. It is also difficult to see how the majority of
Zambians will be able to benefit from renewed
growth without more investment in both human and
physical capital. Without policies to ensure that the
rural population is able to participate in the economy
in the future, the previous inequalities are likely to
re-emerge once growth restarts.
In rural areas, the poor are constrained from being
able to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
by the reform programme by a number of factors.
These include: a shortage of labour in rural areas;
gender biases, especially against women acting as
heads of households (female-headed households
are disproportionally represented among the poor);
and the need to guard against shocks, including
market failure, sickness and death and drought.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the
risks faced by the rural poor are increasing, from
market instability as government intervention is re-
duced, from AIDS and from possible climate
change. If the poor are to be encouraged and
supported to make productive investments for the
fuftre, bath in their own skills and education and
in productive assets, then action to help reduce
rIsks, for example, tlrougii an effective government
sponsored social safety net is likely to be needed.
An important factor in assessing alternative mecha-
nisms for deli"ering the safety net, therefore, will
be the extent to which they help to promote invest-
ment as well as protecting consumption.
Originally PPM was established only in the 27 (Out of 56) districts
directly affected by the drought.
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4 CONCLUSIONS
The links between development and relief in Zam-
bia are clearly illustrated by the extent to which
previous policy distortions have resulted in in-
creased vulnerability to drought, especially for the
rural population. Over-emphasis on a single policy
goal, national self-sufficiency in maize production,
has led to a production pattern which does not
represent comparative advantage and which has
resulted in the weakening of indigenous strategies
to reduce the impact of drought. In the future, it will
be important to ensure that food policy addresses
the problem of food security at the level of house-
holds and communities and does not just concentrate
on national self-sufficiency. This will require a sus-
tained approach involving research, extension,
marketing policy and the strengthening of commu-
nity level organizations. In principle, this has been
accepted by government, although the policy yet
to be put into action. For example, the recent
Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP),
developed by the government with World Bank
support made little mention of household food
security or the threat of drought.
Following the drought period, renewed attention in
Zambia has been given to the development of a
medium-term poverty strategy. This is probably the
most positive outcome of the emergency and indi-
cates how successful relief programmes can lead to
a more sustained development process. Pressure
from donors has played a part. For example, the
World Bank has undertaken a detailed poverty as-
sessment in order to develop such a strategy and
the latest round of structural adjustment lending
has applied conditionality to social policy for the
first time. However, the momentum towards devel-
oping a poverty strategy undoubtedly derives
in greatest part from the success of PPM and the
partnership with the non-governmental sector.
Although the formal strategy still needs to be estab-
lished, it is clear that three main strands will be
involved: improving the access to and delivery of
basic social services; helping households to invest
by providing price incentives and by improving ac-
cess to productive assets; and the provision of an
effective social safety net. The success of PPM has
led to moves to establish an ongoing safety net funded
by government and donors, but very largely deliv-
ered by communities and NGOs. In the immediate
post-drought recovery period, PPM has been contin-
ued and indeed expanded to cover the whole
country5. Food-for-work and other public employ-
ment schemes have been seen as key delivery
mechanisms. They have widespread political sup-
port and are likely to be maintained in some form.
Over 11 million dollars have been provided by
donors and the government for post-drought recov-
ery activities, including the provision of agricultural
inputs, development of on-farm storage, rehabilita-
tion of infrastructure and direct assistance to the
destitute (PAM 1994).
A number of important issues remain, however, and
these will need to be addressed in the near future. In
particular, key questions include: how the relation-
ship between government and NGOs can be man-
aged on a continuing basis; how to design public
employment schemes to enhance investment, espe-
cially in human capital; how to address the problem
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